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Oil, Conflict, and the Dynamics of Resource Struggle in the Niger Delta: A 
Comparison of the Ogoni and Ijaw Movements 
ABSTRACT 
Conflict in the Niger Delta has attracted significant local and international concern and 
reactions. Although several theses have discussed the recurring structural facets of the 
conflict, such as resource governance, marginalization, and neglect, which serve as the 
bases for understanding the grievances, a crucial question has remained unanswered: 
why have the Ogoni and the Ijaw, who have shared common, lived experiences, reacted 
differently to the same regional problems? Why has one chosen violence and the other, 
a non-violent contestation? This article argues that the three factors narratives, 
leadership, and organization have determined the dynamics of the choice between the 
distinct courses of action taken by each group, and suggests that the Ogoni and the Ijaw 
have waged distinct wars and been fighting context-specific battles constructed and 




Studies on conflict in the Niger Delta region have largely focused on debates from the 
perspectives of resource exploitation, marginalization, and neglect. Although 
significant, these discourses seem to present the conflict as representative of the region 
but neglect the impact of local understandings of the problem. To address this lacuna, 
this article explores the Ogoni and Ijaw movements which, despite sharing similar lived 
experiences, have each challenged the state through different courses of action: through 
Ogoni non-violence under the leadership of Ken Saro-Wiwa, and through Ijaw 
confrontation with a fluid leadership style including both violence and non-violence. 
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Drawing on data from research carried out between 2014 and 2017,1 this article argues 
that leaders’ choices are more important than their unspoken intentions in framing 
narratives and collective identities. To understand the complexity and distinctiveness 
of the two movements, much narrower theoretical and analytical perspectives are 
necessary to focus particularly on the processes and mechanisms employed by the two 
sets of leaders in charting their specific courses of action. The article finds that while 
the Ogoni base their resource-related arguments on a discourse about internal 
colonialism tempered by a human and minority rights discourse which stresses human 
agency, the Ijaw perceive themselves as helpless victims of deliberate and calculated 
neglect. The Ogoni demonstrate a strong culture of collective agency in deciding that 
the best way to engage the state is in the form of non-violence, while the Ijaw claim 
that the state has denied agency to Ijaw people, leaves them with only with one option: 
to engage in violence. Having outlined the dynamics of choice between non-violence 
or violence, the article then links theoretical and conceptual underpinnings to framing 
and collective identity in the Ogoni and Ijaw movements. Section 2 reviews the two 
groups’ historical narratives, Section 3 compares the nature of their leaderships, and 
Section 4 provides an overview of non-violent and violent struggles within the two 
groups.  
 
1.1 Methodology and Scope 
 
Studies that seek to explore and gain a deep understanding of why ethnic groups that 
share similar lived experiences and environments choose different steps in seeking 
solutions to their problems are based on the premise that the human world is an artifice, 
                                                             
1 I conducted 41 interviews with key actors who participated in shaping the movements, 
focusing especially on activists and scholars because of their wealth of knowledge.  
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suggesting that actors’ perceptions of their actions are important (Kratochwil, 2006) in 
research. A crucial aspect of the current article is the use of social constructivism as a 
framework to focus on what constitutes our knowledge of the world and how it has 
been constructed (ibid). Drawing on Davidson (1963), Adler (1997) argues that 
people’s actions are explained by “causes”: when individuals act, they do so based on 
one cause or another. The idea of reacting or undertaking actions for a reason signifies 
applying an understanding of “what is called for” within a set of circumstances 
(Giddens, 1984: 345). This suggests a link with the identification of an underlying bond 
between ideas and material relations (Fierke, 2015; Melucci, 1994). Such an 
understanding is important, especially in appreciating how, in the process of reacting 
to similar structural issues, groups switch from one strategy to another (Fierke, 2015: 
124). The emphasis in this article is on the collective understandings that represent the 
relevant facts (Melucci, 1994) and not merely observations constituted of the meanings 
that the Ogoni and the Ijaw have brought to their interactions (ibid). 
 
Accordingly, this study employs a multi case-study approach as the most practicable 
method to arrive at answers to the research question. Case studies are crucial for 
description (King et al., 1994: 44): they allow for an understanding of the “why and 
how” in conflicts, particularly by viewing such conflicts from the perspectives of the 
key actors and parties that use various strategies to express their grievances. Given the 
complexity of the dynamics of choice in the case of the Ogoni and Ijaw movements, a 
broad approach was needed that would be suitable for identifying critical mechanisms 
and variables of interest that could explain why one group adopted non-violence and 
the other chose violence. A deep understanding of each distinct and unique case was 
imperative in determining the foundation for the analytical framework used in the cross-
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case comparison (ibid.) of Ogoni non-violence versus Ijaw violence. This approach 
explains the similarities between the logic of the comparative method and that of other 
methods, embedded in its attempt to advance clarity by the “systematic manipulations 
of parameters and operative variables” (Smelser, 1976: 158; see also Lijphart, 1975: 
160). The case-study method generates a rich, in-depth analysis, especially when it 
combines face-to-face interviews, as a form of oral history, with data from existing 
literature and other secondary sources. Employing the perspectives of key actors, I use 
case studies for description and understanding as well as to clarify complicated causal 
links in real-life interventions and to illustrate the real-life contexts within which 
contentions in the Niger Delta occurred. 
 
During the fieldwork for the current study, it became clear that debates between the 
extractive industries and society in the Niger Delta have been shaped by developments 
both within Nigeria and internationally, and it was likely that international experiences 
had discernible impacts on the dynamics of choices made by leaders in the Ogoni and 
Ijaw ethnic groups. Thus, the construction of meaning in this article is historically and 
culturally specific and is examined in context by incorporating the self-conscious 
viewpoints of the key actors. Structured interviews with members of the elite were 
undertaken at four different sites, namely, Port Harcourt, Bayelsa, Abuja, and London, 
with informants and actors who were key to shaping the Niger Delta movements; the 
interviews produced a finely grained explanation of the different components of the 
struggles. I also consulted a wide range of literature, examining theoretical concepts 
such as contention, narratives, framing, collective action, and social movements. I drew 
certain conclusions on the importance of leadership as well as the role of narratives and 
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organization because of the ways that conflict and enemy were constructed in the two 
cases.  
 
Niger Delta communities including the Ogoni and Ijaw have been characterized by a 
number of common lived experiences including marginalization and inequality, as well 
as environmental, socio-economic, and political arguments (Demirel-Pegg and Pegg, 
2015; Isumonah, 2015; Watts, 1999, 2003, 2015). The power dynamics that developed 
after the Nigerian Civil War and as a result of the political economy based on the 
proceeds of oil exploitation are cited as root causes of the conflicts in the area (Demirel-
Pegg and Pegg, 2015; Naanen, 1995; Okonta, 2008). These factors heralded deep-
rooted divisions, which have manifested in several ways. Such contentious politics 
necessitate historical understandings that try to answer the question of “why 
movements integrate some decisive features” (Tilly and Wood, 2009: 3). Things come 
into being as the result of human acts of conception that occur within a “cultural, 
historical and political context of meaning”, and become social facts because of the 
framing and meaning ascribed to them (Fierke, 2016: 182). 
 
Frames symbolize representations of explanation allowing people to trace, 
comprehend, and label episodes within their life space and the world, with the sole 
purpose of organizing experience and directing action (Benford and Snow, 2000). 
Within the context of the Ogoni and Ijaw movements, frames identify and underscore 
the urgency and gravity of social problems, hence articulating claim-making among a 
range of functions (Benford and Hunt, 1993; Benford and Snow, 2000). Although, as 
Walton (2014) notes, social movements do not originate frames, in some cases, they 
are essential to achieving intended goals (Benford and Snow, 2000). Genocide, for 
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instance, is a very powerful frame, as are human rights and internal colonialism 
(Naanen, 1995; Saro-Wiwa, 1995a). Saro-Wiwa situated the Ogoni agenda within the 
frame of genocide, highlighting how billions of dollars’ worth of oil and gas were 
carried away from Ogoniland (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a, 1992). Consequently, collective 
action frames emerge through an interactive and negotiated process whereby groups, 
drawing on and modifying existing cultural beliefs such as marginalization and 
inequality, deliberately mold their grievances and strategies for collective action 
(Melucci, 1994; Snow et al., 1986).  
 
Motivational framing, for instance, provides a call to arms or a basis for engaging in 
corrective collective action, especially the construction of suitable vocabularies of 
motive (Benford and Snow, 2000). As Gamson (1992) suggests, collective action is 
mainly the outcome of negotiating shared meaning, while framed collective action 
constitutes a social dilemma related to individuals participating in movements because 
of perceived collective benefits in the form of “free-riding” (Olson, 1968). Although 
this is true, accepting that framing in movements serves as the link to understanding the 
past in relation to the present raises the question of how these frames are constructed to 
drive people to act in movements. The Extractive Industries and Society has published 
extensively on the Niger Delta, highlighting key problems related to resource issues 
and the community.2 Most recently, Graham and Ovadia (2019) analysed the trends and 
development of oil exploration and production in Sub-Saharan Africa, exploring the 
increasing paradox of petro-development in several African countries, and emphasizing 
the inadequate and poorly implemented legal and regulatory frameworks. Employing a 
                                                             
2 See: Ako, 2015; Demirel-Pegg and Pegg, 2015; Idemudia, 2014; Isumonah, 2015; Iwilade, 
2017; Naanen, 2019; Obi, 2014; Pegg, 2015; Senewo, 2015; Tantua et al., 2018; Watts, 2015.  
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subnational lens, Gutierrez Rodriguez (2019) examined the mechanisms of the 
relationship, if any, between oil wealth and internal conflicts. While all these 
contributions are important to an understanding of the Niger Delta, none of them has 
explored comparatively the dynamics of non-violence and violence in the Ogoni and 
Ijaw movements. This article therefore adds to the literature on the Niger Delta 
precisely by considering the typology of choice based on narratives, leadership, and 
organization. It provides a more nuanced understanding of the distinct nature of the two 
movements as forms of strategic choice  in which leaders chose their tactics by gauging 
environmental opportunities and limitations, overlooking the basic reality that strategic 
options may be inherently appealing (Polletta and Jasper, 2001) in movements.  
 
Life narratives are embedded in human experience, hence the importance of language 
to the negotiation of meaning and the social construction of identity in everyday life 
(Davis, 2002; DeCesare, 2013; Johnston et al., 1994). Narratives, especially those 
detailing political violence and painful pasts, can be regarded within three frames of 
connotations: the main actor, the event, and the socio-political context of the event 
(Vinitzky-Seroussi, 2001). The motivations and qualities of the perpetrator and victim 
of violence are framed within a narrative that justifies the inevitability of the 
confrontation (Smith, 1997). Therefore, historical reflections help people become 
aware of the dialectic of choice in recollecting and joining the past with the future by 
means of a present political project (Kratochwil, 2006: 8).  
 




Although the Ogoni and Ijaw live in similar topographical conditions and share 
common values and culture, the two groups’ narratives are not indicative of a collective 
voice or representative of the region. The Ogoni ethnic identity  constructed under the 
leadership of Ken Saro-Wiwa in the 1990s, was based on their lived circumstances as 
a distinct nation challenged by immense economic and political difficulties (Okonta, 
2008: 4). From the 1980s, the Ogoni realized that while their leaders had faithfully 
cooperated with the other Nigerian peoples, their faith had been seriously misplaced, 
as each ethnic group had its own agenda entirely unconnected to the notion of 
collaboration in a multi-ethnic country (Saro-Wiwa, 1992). Similarly, several Ijaw3 
leaders such as Dapa Briye and Claude Ake advocated and appealed for greater 
consideration for the environment, as well as autonomy, and fiscal federalism, but the 
state was not forthcoming.  
 
Although the Ogoni narrative developed from the perception of exploitation for 
personal or ethnic benefits (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a), the Ijaw claim that despite land being 
at a premium and tied to its African inhabitants by a near-spiritual tie, it is expropriated 
by a government policy: “By instrument of government policies, our land is 
expropriated and the people are not directly or indirectly benefitting from its wealth. It 
is aggregated anger at that situation that gave rise to the charters of demand”. 4 
 
Saro-Wiwa (1992) contended that the Ogoni had inherited a valuable portion of land 
endowed with the rich plateau soil that provided agricultural blessings, while the rivers 
                                                             
3 Benatari (1998) suggests that the formation of the Ijaw ethnic nation was a gradual process, 
dating back to the period 500 BCE to 700 CE, during which the proto-Ijaws or “ancient 
people” ancestors settled in the central Delta and merged with immigrants who came later. 
4 Interview with Lancelot, Ijaw leader, 2 August 2015. 
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flowing along the borders of the area were abundant with fish and seafood. Ijaw leaders’ 
dominant narratives refer to several complaints and appeals pre-independence to the 
1990s, which yielded very few results. The emphasis on environmental degradation and 
its disastrous consequences on the sources of both the Ogoni and Ijaw peoples’ 
livelihoods provided a new basis for forging closer ties around common problems 
against the state.  
 
Both the Ogoni and Ijaw regarded the colonial state as authoritarian and committed to 
extraction rather than to development (Mamdani, 1996), compelling its subjects to 
finance their own infrastructural development (Nwajiaku 2005). The process of 
Nigeria’s unification in 1914 saw several ethnic groups with diverse languages, 
cultures, and histories forced together (ibid.). British colonialism imposed alien 
structures onto the country and steered the Ogoni into domestic colonialism, with the 
administration of Ogoni becoming part of Opobo division in 1908. The creation of 
Rivers state in 1967 by the second military regime of independent Nigeria was seen by 
Saro-Wiwa as a deliberate strategy to steer the Ogoni into extinction (Saro-Wiwa, 
1995a: 73). Osha (2006, 2007) identified two main forms of colonialism in the Ogoni 
context: one imposed by the British colonial regime and one pursued by the post-
colonial state. 
 
Domestic colonialism is located within the social relations that exist between the Ogoni 
and other distinct, culturally varied groups; it is based on domination and exploitation, 
and socio-political inequalities within a given territory. Ogoni leaders often referred to 
the actions of the post-colonial state as a type of internal colonialism, amounting to the 
substitution of foreign colonialism with a local version (Mitee, 1999). Naanen (1995) 
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contends that internal colonialism arose in Nigeria not based on economic domination 
but through a skillful pursuit of control critically facilitated by numerical 
predominance:  
The traditional system at some point started to buckle under when oil 
operations started from the 70s when we were battling with internal 
colonialism, by our neighbours. Ogoni was treated virtually as a colony by 
the larger numerically more preponderant ethnic neighbours especially the 
Igbo. 5 
 
For many Ogoni leaders, internal colonialism remains a valid description of their 
situation. While internal colonialism as a Marxist concept originated in the 1960s, 
Ogoni leaders linked it to issues of human and minority rights in the 1990s, arguing 
that it had to be confronted by peaceful means rather than revolutionary means. Naanen 
clarified:  
Internal colonialism may not necessarily be Marxist, and it could be liberal. 
It wasn’t originally a pure Marxist approach but you could apply that to 
class, even the division of the world into rich nations and the peripheral 
nations, in which the periphery is exploited for the benefit of the metropolis. 
But basically the way that Hechter did it, was a liberal formulation. 6 
 
Naanen was struck by Hechter’s (1975) description of the British experience in which 
England was regarded as the core and Scotland and Wales as the fringes of the British 
system:  
It analysed the English domination of the United Kingdom. We applied it 
to the Ogoni cause whereby the local ethnic communities dominated the 
Ogoni right from the beginning of the 19th and the 20th centuries. Through 
the migration of ethnic communities into the area and how they imposed 
their rule and their supremacy on the Ogoni. That was part of the origin of 
the domination, which people consolidated in the post-independence years 
under the post-colonial state. 7 
 
                                                             
5 Interview with Professor Ben Naanen, Ogoni leader, 31 July 2015. 




In contrast to the Ogoni view of the state in terms of internal colonialism, the Ijaw 
construct their marginalization outward against the central Nigerian state and the 
dominant Igbo ethnic group. The Ijaw argue that their underdevelopment began with 
British discriminatory and anti-Ijaw policies (Osaghae, 2008). The state, they argue, 
was not extracting to replace; rather it was creating an infrastructure of wasting the 
land, which is violence on nature. Ijaw leaders branded the peaceful Ogoni struggle a 
failed strategy, vindicating the need to resort to violence. The two narratives convey 
the sense of a critical historical juncture represented by Saro-Wiwa’s execution in 1995 
by the then military administration of General Sani Abacha, an event argued to be one 
of the most significant factors that transformed the conflict into one characterized by 
militia activities (Comfort, 2002; Isumonah, 2004). The narratives indicate that the 
killing of Saro-Wiwa was not seen as solely an Ogoni issue; it was constructed as 
shared, especially by the young people in the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) who launched 
their operation climate change as a response to his execution. However, it can also be 
argued that the representation of violence in earlier narratives by the Ijaw leaders, as 
being constitutive of the nature of the state’s actions, had paved the way for justifying 
a violently confrontational struggle.  
 
Although the Ijaw leaders interviewed during this research project did not speak in 
terms of internal colonialism, their examination of the state bore many similarities with 
the Ogoni. The Ijaw situation could be seen as a form of internal colonialism, but for 
the fact that the Ogoni narrative suggests a sense of agency, that there is something to 
be done about the Nigerian state’s actions by linking up with international struggles. 
For the Ijaw, in contrast, a distinctive sense of desperation, frustration, and impotence 




Both the Ogoni and Ijaw lay claim to the oil in their territories, seeing it as both a 
blessing and the major reason for their troubles (Idemudia, 2014; Iwilade, 2017; Obi, 
2014; Tantua et al., 2018). Oil, they argue, has been utilized to the benefit of a few and 
to the detriment of the vast majority, given its negative impacts on the environment. 
From the late 1980s, the Ogoni situated their claims within a global discourse of social 
justice and human/environmental rights, aimed at controlling oil resources and 
achieving a right to self-determination (Isumonah, 2015; Obi, 2009). In the 1990s, Saro-
Wiwa highlighted, for instance, the UN regulations Procedure 1503: “if a case is 
presented and the UN investigates and sees a consistent pattern of rights violation, a 
reference will be made to the Nigerian government and action will start from there” 
(Saro-Wiwa, 1993b). The inference, therefore, is that the main Ogoni aim was to use 
references to clear-cut UN issues to attract specific international attention and 
legitimization. According to Comfort (2002), such struggles for environmental rights 
relate to fights for environmental conservation, indicating the deep contestation of   
international models of development responsible for growing inequality. However, 
despite having some validity, this argument fails to explain the relation between the 
inclusions of these rights and the non-violent nature of the Ogoni struggle.  
 
Internationalism and transnationalism played key roles within the Ogoni struggle, 
especially regarding the emphasis on human and minority rights violations. The 
deliberate adoption of a narrative acceptable to the UN gave the Ogoni the edge they 
needed to attract international attention. Because of its insistence that its members 
forswear violence in their struggles, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization (UNPO) held great appeal for the Ogoni (Saro-Wiwa, 1995a). Saro-Wiwa 
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mobilized the Ogoni to recognize the negative impacts of an abused environment by 
emphasizing the importance of never using violence. Interviewees also mentioned how 
Saro-Wiwa found philosophical inspiration: “Ken followed the examples of 
philosophers like Thomas Paine who wrote the famous Rights of Man, John Locke on 
People’s Right to Self-determination, people’s rights to existence. They are 
affirmations of several other international declarations of human rights”. 8 
 
The inclusion in the Ogoni struggle of narratives linking the powerful concepts of 
internal colonialism and human rights in ways that support non-violence has often been 
overlooked by scholars, although some have explored specific dimensions of internal 
colonialism and human rights (e.g. Okonta, 2008). According to Naanen:  
The discourse between internal colonialism and human rights took place 
simultaneously, the internal colonialism actually predates the human rights 
issue. Right from the beginning of the century up to the time of the civil 
war, and it even continued under the new regimes in Nigeria, but the human 
rights issue was mostly associated with the Babangida and Abacha eras. 9 
 
 Naanen suggests a narrative of clear understanding, choice, and the strategic inclusion 
of human rights in the Ogoni agenda. Thus, what emerges is a sense of positive agency 
indicating the framing of Ogoni issues within environmental justice and showing 
similarities to ethnic politics that works toward a new social construction revolving 
around environmental justice (Saunders, 2013).  
 
The situation with the Ijaw was rather different: “From 1997 to 1998, we didn’t do any 
international campaigns. At the time we started, everything we did was within Nigeria 
                                                             
8 Interview with Dr Desmond Alubabari Nbete, Ogoni, 27 July 2015. 
9 Interview with Ben Naanen 31 July 2015. 
14 
 
and later with Friends of the Earth and Human Rights Watch”. 10  Although the Ijaw as 
a whole did not engage in transnationalism or internationalism in this period, the IYC 
did: in 1999 the IYC wrote to former American president Jimmy Carter (IYC, 1999a): 
“One was our official letter to former president Jimmy Carter and he also replied 
supporting our option for peaceful engagement with the government and his offer to 
also speak with the military government at that point in time” (Interview: 31 January 
2017). 11 
 
The IYC’s letter to former president Jimmy Carter dated 2 March 1999 was a response 
to his visit to Port Harcourt indicating his recognition of Ijaw grievances (IYC, 1999a). 
Human rights were part of the issues the Ijaw dealt with internationally: 
We needed organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch to monitor the environmental impact of oil production, and the 
human rights abuses occasioned by civil protests and the reaction of the state 
especially the military, the extra judicial killings. 12 
 
The 1999 HRW report, “The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights 
Violations in the Niger Delta”, was the result of Ijaw attempts to draw attention to the 
situation. An open letter to the state, entitled “The World is Watching”, highlighted 
extreme concerns about the movement of armed troops in the Ijaw area; it was signed 
by approximately 500 organizations and well-known individuals from around the world 
and thus indicated international support for the Ijaw movement:  
In 1999, about 500 organisations and notable personalities around the world 
carried a full-page advert in the Guardian newspaper expressing concerns 
about steps taken by the government and the military onslaught against Ijaw 
youths in the aftermath of the Kaiama Declaration. 13   
                                                             
10 Interview with Ijaw leader (confidential source) 2, 29 July 2015. 
11 Interview with Patterson Ogon, Ijaw 30 July 2015.  





In Canada, Oronto Douglas, an Ijaw leader, made further attempts at internationalizing 
the Ijaw cause (Bob, 2014; Watts, 2015). In a speech at the “Petrolio ambiente e diritti 
umani” Conference in Rome in May 1999, Oronto suggested that Italian petroleum 
company Agip might be involved in human rights violations and in practices against 
the environment (Eni Agip Letter, 1999), which had quite an effect:  
Oronto also had the opportunity of addressing some members of the 
European Parliament, which led to the visit of some members of the 
Italian parliament to review the activities of Agip. I took them round for 
one month to explore areas where Agip does its operations. It resulted in 
their interactions with the management on our behalf. 14 
 
After these peaceful Ijaw activities, however, the establishment of the Movement for 
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) marked a turning point away from non-
violent protests to armed insurgency (Obi, 2012; Watts, 2015). This could be attributed 
to the 1999 Odi massacre, during which the village of Odi was destroyed in the biggest 
internal military operation ever witnessed, igniting local and international 
condemnation for the then President Olusegun Obasanjo. The armed forces spent 14 
days in Odi, leaving behind raped women and a death toll of more than 2,000 people 
including women and children of varying ages (HRW, 1999; Omotola, 2006, 2009). It 
is possible to argue that these excesses were the trigger for Ijaw violence.  
 
3. NATURE OF THE OGONI AND IJAW LEADERSHIP 
 
Leaders are fundamentally important because of the indispensable role they play in 
shaping movements (Ganz and McKenna, 2017; Morris and Staggenborg, 2004; 
                                                             
14 Interview with Patterson Ogon, 25 March 2017. 
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Nepstad and Bob, 2006) through their social and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1991; 
DeCesare, 2013). The first Ogoni struggle, initiated by Paul Birabi in the early 1940s, 
focused on the need for community-based educational programmes as the ideal route 
to advance the Ogoni community and, at the same time, raised Ogoni political 
consciousness (Okonta, 2008). Elites and demobilized Ogoni soldiers such as S.F. 
Nwika, Paul Birabi, and F.M.A. Saronwiyo (Okonta, 2008: 64) founded the Ogoni 
Central Union (OCU) as a social and cultural platform for all Ogoni, to unify the groups 
with an emphasis on socio-economic advancement. However, the OCU became 
inactive due to its key leaders, including Birabi, going away for further studies. Birabi 
recognized that the Ogoni were not united around a common political platform; for 
administrative autonomy to take place, he felt that the Ogoni had to be politically 
mobilized and thus able to sway the regional government’s policies (Okonta, 2008). 
This heralded the birth of the Ogoni State Representation Assembly (OSRA) in 1950 
with Birabi as president, while the OCU was disbanded. The OSRA was created to 
further the advancement of a common Ogoni ethnic identity and to foster the interests 
of all Ogoni (Isumonah, 2004: 440). In a tour of villages in 1952 and 1953, Birabi, 
under the umbrella of OSRA, was particularly noted for his full participatory 
discussions. Okonta (2008) concludes that through such grassroots dialogues, Birabi 
instilled not only the need for unity within Ogoniland but also the importance of 
obtaining formal education. Despite the stirrings of political enlightenment in 
Ogoniland under Birabi, however, the 1950s were largely overshadowed by Nigeria’s 
quest for independence (ibid: 71).  
 
After Birabi’s death in 1953, no significant struggle was recorded in Ogoniland until 
Ken Saro-Wiwa emerged, determined to pick up where Birabi had left off. In 1962, 
17 
 
after the collapse of OSRA, the Ogoni Divisional Union (ODU) was set up as an avenue 
to advance Ogoni interests, leading to the creation of Rivers state in 1967 (Isumonah, 
2004, 2015). While the ODU had preserved the Ogoni minority awareness within the 
state, it was replaced by two much less political Ogoni ethnic organizations — the 
Ogoni Club, which comprised young Ogoni graduates, and the Kagote Club, which 
comprised the Ogoni elite (Isumonah, 2004: 442) — and only later by the Movement 
for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Saro-Wiwa, who, in various roles, had 
been part of the government, emerged to challenge the central state and the 
multinational oil companies such as Shell over the region’s environmental degradation, 
exacerbated by resource extraction (Okonta, 2008; Osha, 2007). Unlike that of Adaka 
Boro (see below), Saro-Wiwa’s movement was predicated on the principle of 
intellectual judgement through constructive criticism and dialogue. In the wake of the 
earlier Ogoni drives toward a broader unity, the consequences of environmental damage 
and the lack of development in the region had become obvious, promoting the 
recognition of common threats and goals (Cayford, 1996: 187). Because Saro-Wiwa 
took advantage of his insider experience to press for environmental justice and a non-
violent path to social change, his political development could be described as both 
logical and contradictory (Comfort 2002:  232).  
 
Saro-Wiwa’s clear observation and understanding of the prevailing political conditions 
in the United States of America and Western European states strengthened his 
acceptance of a number of universally valid generalizations regarding political actions 
of the state (Nbete, 2006: 164). His philosophy can be contextualized in terms of his 
efforts to reterritorialize his area of expertise to the grassroots in galvanizing communal 
backing and involvement (Tam-George, 2010: 298). This may have contributed to 
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Saro-Wiwa’s determination to offer philosophical resolutions to Nigeria’s problems — 
a determination that created several divisions within the group and led to conflicts with 
the state, including the murder of four prominent Ogoni elites in Giokoo and the arrest 
and detention of Saro-Wiwa along with nine others. However, mobilizations (Mccarthy 
and Zald, 1977) within Ogoniland at that time were very troubling because, whether 
the Ogoni leaders appreciated it or not, their non-violent approach threatened the 
survival of the Abacha regime. The reactions of the Abacha administration could be 
interpreted in two ways: first, as a defiance of both the Ogoni and the international 
community that had reacted to the Odi massacre; and, second, as a signal to other groups 
(Isumonah, 2015) in the Niger Delta of what would befall them if they took the path of 
the Ogoni. 
 
After the execution of Saro-Wiwa in 1995, Ogoni leadership passed on to Ledum Mitee 
in 1995, to Ben Naanen in 2012, and to Legborsi Pyagbara after 1 year. At the time of 
writing, a leadership tussle is ongoing, and the leadership is yet to be determined. 
Naanen served as the secretary general of MOSOP from 1992 to 1999, becoming 
Chairman, Provisional Council, only after Ledum Mitee was removed from office in 
2012.  Pyagbara is the current president. Like Saro-Wiwa, Mitee also had leadership 
issues. Some in Ogoniland saw him as a sell-out, but he led the organization for 10 
years without violence, making his period of leadership significant. In the interviews, 
several Ogoni elites mentioned leaders whose style did not match that of Saro-Wiwa: 
Subsequent leaders after Saro-Wiwa adopted a leadership style that falls 
short of what should have been the model of leadership. This is supposed to 
be a grassroots movement and Ledum adopted some kind of elitist approach, 
he was insulated from the people. He became closer to the government, the 
very people that you are supposed to confront. To us that compromised the 
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fervor of his confrontation with the state. The present leadership falls far 
short of what we had under Ledum. 15 
 
 Although accused of failing to unify the Ogoni as Saro-Wiwa did, Mitee ensured that 
the Ogoni used language very powerfully as a motivational tool in uniting the Ogoni. 
The use of phrases such as courage, discipline, and resilience in the face of agonies 
created a non-violent undertone which mirrored Saro-Wiwa’s leadership style.  
 
The Ogoni leaders’ outlook has rested on the understanding of global environmental 
debates and specifically the deliberate adoption of non-violence and the principles of 
ethnic autonomy, resource and environmental control (ERECTISM). Saro-Wiwa 
connected ethnic autonomy to resource and environmental control (see Watts, 2015; 
Osha, 2007), based on the correlation between natural resources, the physical 
environment, and the international importance of the environment (Nbete, 2006). 
Interviewed leaders stressed that environmental justice was not the only goal the Ogoni 
people were fighting for, but Saro-Wiwa recognized the increasing global awareness of 
environmental protection issues and tapped into international discourse (Bob, 2002; 
Isumonah, 2015):  
 
Ken understood the need to protect the environment, there was so much talk 
about global warming, and ozone layer depletion. He keyed into the global 
narrative, so even the issue of political marginalization, which was a major 
factor, was kind of subordinated to the environmental pollution and the 
Ogoni caught international attention. 16   
 
In the course of his leadership (Barker et al., 2001), Saro-Wiwa seemed to use two 
arguments: first, he stressed the importance of being principled, emphasizing the 
                                                             
15 Interview with Ogoni leader, 31 July 2015. 
16 Interview with Nbete, 27 July 2015. 
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principles of non-violence as advocated by Gandhi; second, he used a pragmatic 
argument based on his knowledge of the small number of Ogoni indigenes within 
Rivers state.  
 
It can be argued that the Ogoni leadership benefitted from higher levels of social and 
educational capital compared to the Ijaw leadership. The Ogoni leaders, taking 
advantage of this, gave a prominent role to agency in charting the Ogoni agenda 
(Nepstad and Bob, 2006: 3). Indeed, the Ogoni leaders’ level of education, work 
experience, exposure, and world view helped them articulate their grievances to the 
kinds of networks that could enhance their engagement in and maintenance of non-
violence. Saro-Wiwa, for instance, gained international attention and recognition as a 
writer, publisher, environmentalist, and human rights activist (MOSOP, 2004: 1). Most 
of the subsequent Ogoni leaders have been graduates and some hold post-graduate 
degrees, some from international universities; they have had professional jobs or high-
ranking positions as civil servants. The leaders’ wide-ranging education has helped 
them to critically assess and articulate their specific problems. This is an illustration of 
“universalistic cultural capital” — the knowledge of the ideals, empathies, cultural 
principles, and political trends within the wider publics they aim to connect with 
(Nepstad and Bob, 2006: 4). The example of the Ogoni leaders shows that persuasive 
rhetorical abilities and the use of strategic knowledge to recognize opportunities and 
overcome barriers in their political grounds are essential for movement leaders (ibid.).  
 
The Ijaw movement is interesting for the fluid shifting of its position between violence 
and non-violence. In the 1960s, it conducted a short-lived violent rebellion under the 
leadership of Boro; in the l990s, it turned non-violent, similar to the Ogoni; while in 
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2003–2004, the struggle again became violent under radical armed leaders such as 
Asari Dokubo (Tantua et al., 2018). The Ijaw national struggle for self-determination 
began with a violent rebellion in the Niger Delta, in the form of a 12-day revolution in 
1966 spearheaded by the late Ijaw patriots Issac Adaka Boro, Samuel Owonaru, and 
Nottingham Dick from the Kaiama community in Rivers state, under the group known 
as Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) (Watts, 2003). Boro’s ascent to Ijaw leadership 
was based on the premise that a fairer share of the oil revenues was a right of the Ijaw. 
This idea for the rebellion came from the conviction that a majority of Ijaw youths were 
frustrated by the general neglect of their communities, and ready for any action that 
would liberate them from the central Nigerian state. Boro’s primary intention was to 
create an independent Niger Delta state, thus solving the human and infrastructural 
developmental challenges (Omotola, 2009). To secede from the Nigerian state, Boro 
declared the Niger Delta Republic on 23 February 1966 (Darah, 1995). Boro’s rhetoric 
was clearly violent: he did not shy away from what he intended to do. However, the 
rebellion was crushed by the state on 7 March 1966 after 12 days of fighting. 
Notwithstanding Boro’s early death in 1968, his revolutionary initiative became a 
model for struggles of national resistance against perceived oppression and exploitation 
by the state and multinational oil companies (Darah, 1995: 1). All subsequent Ijaw 
militia groups paid tribute to the Boro rebellion.  
 
The moderate Ijaw youth leaders of the late 1990s, such as Oronto Douglas, Felix 
Tuodolo, and Isaac Osuoka, were more concerned with the development of the region. 
They were neither militants nor insurgents but predominantly enlightened citizens and 
members of the intelligentsia (Afinotan and Ojakorotu, 2009). These youth leaders 
drafted the Kaiama Declaration in the form of demands to the state. In 2003 and 2004, 
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however, notable radical militant leaders including Government Ekpemupolo 
(Tompolo), Asari Dokubo, and Ateke Tom came to power. This second phase of 
leadership had links to groups of criminal cult gangs created and financed by political 
godfathers to threaten and intimidate political opponents, kidnap for ransom, and 
commit crude oil theft (Mukoro, 2010: 82). In the Ogoni history, by contrast, there is 
no record of such armed militant leaders, which serves as further evidence of the Ogoni 
choice of non-violence. 
 
The classification of leaders into different categories raises the question of the actual 
motive behind the Ijaw armed struggle, supporting Demirel-Pegg and Pegg's (2015: 
660) assertion that accepting greed as the major reason for the escalation of the conflict 
is too simplistic. They presented a more compelling perspective of the perceived failure 
of the non-violent methods of collective action as the key factors responsible for the 
violence. Although the Ijaw struggle from the 1960s started with violence and then 
shifted to non-violence in the late 1990s in an attempt to mirror the Ogoni outlook, the 
fragmented and fluid nature of the Ijaw leadership allowed the non-violent community 
protest to turn into a full-blown violent insurgency. The Ogoni’s failed non-violent 
efforts led to a debate among Ijaw leaders on whether to maintain non-violence:  
We’ve made non-violent efforts, and you see the response. How can we 
continue to follow this non-violent method? Some sections of the group 
decided that the more effective way to deal with these issues is to go violent, 
but there were some who decided to stay the course of non-violence. 17 
 
There was, therefore, a juxtaposing of non-violence versus violence before the violent 
option was adopted. While moderates spearheaded the struggle toward established 
                                                             
17 Interview with Ijaw leader 1, 28 July 2015. 
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forms of collective action, smaller and newer groups became uncompromising,  
engaging in fierce rhetoric and strategies in a bid to clearly distinguish between 
themselves and the moderates (Demirel-Pegg and Pegg, 2015):  
We know when it is time to change our tactics, why should we remain 
peaceful, when government has forgotten about Ijaw suffering? Whose 
mandate is it to tell the Ijaw people to remain calm when all they can see is 
suffering? We have to reclaim what is rightfully ours with our strength not 
with words but with our military style. 18 
 
The Ijaw felt the need to adopt a different strategy to stand up to a state that was noted 
for the use of force to suppress agitations and opposition, especially in the Niger Delta, 
as seen in the Ogoni case: 
We had to change our way since our rights are not given to us. Violence is 
the only way we can use to tackle the Nigerian state because they 
understand it better than us. 19  
 
We blow up stations because that is the source of government money. The 
best way to tackle government is to destroy these instalments before we go 
one on one (Interview with Boyloaf Vanguard Newspaper, 2008).  
 
As a founding member of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) in 1998, Asari Dokubo started 
as its vice president, but his commitment, stamina, and leadership abilities facilitated 
his promotion to president in 2001. When he left the IYC presidency in 2003 to set up 
the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, Dokubo’s leadership style became directly 
confrontational. In an attempt to justify his leadership, the 2004 NDPVF handbill cited 
the aims and objectives of “the fundamentals of justice and equality, truth, conscience, 
logic and facts, love for humanity as well as sanctity of life” (Etemike, 2009: 159) as 
key to being an Ijaw leader. In particular, Dokubo’s declared political ideology was to 
advance Ijaw rights through commanding control over their God-given resources. 
                                                             
18 Interview with a confidential source, August 2015. 
19 Interview with Andrew Azazi, 10 August 2015. 
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Dokubo’s depiction of himself as a victim and the NDPVF as the solution to the Ijaw’s 
problems fitted strategically into the prevalent sense of local grievance (ibid.: 90), 
indicating that the NDPVF represented the straightforward refutation of non-violent 
political movements in the Delta. To Dokubo, the Ijaw had to avoid falling into the 
throes of what Adaka Boro foresaw forty years ago, stressing the importance of 
remaining resolute in the pursuit of the ideals of their fallen heroes such as Isaac Adaka 
Boro and Ken Saro-Wiwa (Dokubo, 2009). Dokubo argued that, if the people of the 
Niger Delta did not take up arms and fight the federal government, they would remain 
poor and become even poorer in the future (ibid.).  
These examples suggest that the voices and actions of the radical leaders were louder 
than those of the moderate leaders because their groups were formed with a clear 
intention of violence. On the one hand was a leadership that attempted to make the most 
of its assets; on the other hand, as seen in Dokubo’s style, was a leadership that was 
unable to do the same (Nepstad and Bob, 2006: 4) due to differences in social status. 
The intention here is not to present the educated as non-violent, but rather to show that 
the less educated and less well-travelled are more closely tied to the local situation and 
probably more likely to express their feelings of rage and frustration through 
increasingly radical representations of local demands. 
 
For a period in the 1990s, Ijaw agitation was organized on a more intellectual level by 
Ijaw graduates of local and international universities, similar to the organization of the 
Ogoni movement. The possession of such a degree of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1991) 
enabled them to identify the major issues affecting the Ijaw. The IYC and the Kaiama 
Declaration indicated the Ijaw leaders’ awareness of strategic international trends, 
within which they inserted their issues in a non-violent discourse. Thus, the educational 
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and professional capacities and the intellectual abilities of the Ijaw leadership serve as 
an interesting angle from which to examine the social standing of the group and its 
impact on central and common concerns. Here the similarity between the leaders is 
clear regarding the understanding that the contacts one can make relate to the kind of 
discourse one can promote in order to engage with and gain international recognition. 
The second group of Ijaw leadership did not have the same level of leadership capital 
and was incapable of making effective use of their position (Nepstad and Bob, 2006: 
4). Rather, their close links to the grassroots led them to a line of thinking and action 
that were more concerned with ways to stand up for and defend their people from state 
forces.  
 
4. NON-VIOLENT AND VIOLENT STRATEGIES: AN OVERVIW  
 
4.1 Ogoni Bill of Rights 
 
Saro-Wiwa embarked upon a systematic campaign of persuasion to show the Ogoni the 
path and strategy that had to be adopted. He organized the campaigns in a structured 
way that institutionalized the Ogoni into different groups for the purpose of 
communication. The Ogoni strategy of non-violence is evidenced by the Ogoni Bill of 
Rights (OBR) of 26 August 1990 (see Saro-Wiwa, 1992). Detailing a historical 
narrative of neglect and local misery (Ako, 2015), the OBR addressed the question of 
Nigerian federalism and minority rights and called for active involvement in state 
affairs (Watts, 1999, 2003: 22). Senewo (2015: 665) highlights the strategic importance 
of the OBR as the most important tool used to push forward the struggle for Ogoni 
survival, as well as a framework employed by other groups agitating for their rights 




The Ogoni wanted political autonomy to participate in the affairs of the state as a 
distinct and separate unit, including rights to control and use a fair proportion of Ogoni 
economic resources for their development (see Saro-Wiwa, 1992). The lack of response 
to the OBR from the state and from the multinational company Shell led the Ogoni 
leaders to request support from the international community through an Addendum to 
the OBR in 1991 (ibid: 97). The Addendum expressed dissatisfaction over the state’s 
refusal to grant the Ogoni people an audience and demanded that MOSOP be permitted 
to make a presentation to the UN and the international community (ibid: 98). The OBR 
indicates a deliberate choice of non-violence, and the addition of the Addendum 
attracted immediate interest and prompted non-governmental organizations and human 
and environmental rights organizations such as Amnesty International to support the 
Ogoni plight (Senewo, 2015: 666). Although in the OBR the Ogoni leaders deny asking 
for secession from the Nigerian state, the question of why the Ogoni had a flag and a 
national anthem arises. Isumonah (2004: 444) notes that there was a proposal to fly the 
Ogoni flag alongside the Nigerian flag and simultaneously demand an Ogoni state as 
the “minimum for staying within the Nigerian Federation” (Saro-Wiwa, 1994: 17). This 
separatist attitude may have necessitated a violent suppression by state operatives who 
viewed it as a pursuit of Ogoni sovereignty (Isumonah, 2004: 444). Saro-Wiwa himself 
referred to the Ogoni anthem as a liberation song, as self-determination does not mean 






MOSOP was established in 1990 as a mass movement and an umbrella organization.20 
The all-encompassing membership of MOSOP possibly explains why the Nigerian 
state under the administrations of Generals Babangida and Abacha could not ban it 
(Isumonah, 2004: 442). Okonta (2008) highlights a major flaw within MOSOP, in that 
the movement concentrated on ideologically minded and educated entrepreneurs like 
Saro-Wiwa without a working consensus with other influential political and economic 
elites. Similarly, Watts (2003: 23) observed that, notwithstanding MOSOP’s notable 
record, its ability to act as an integrated pan-Ogoni movement remains an open 
question. Divisions within the Ogoni emerged in June 1993 when the Nigerian state 
called for presidential elections which, under MOSOP directives, the Ogoni decided to 
boycott. Tam-George (2010: 302) argued that for the Ogoni to take part in such an 
election would be to participate in a process that would take control of their lives and 
resources and to agree to be submissive to that authority. Some Ogoni elites, however, 
did not accept the election boycott, causing further divisions within MOSOP. Mitee 
recounted that the proposal to boycott was advanced by Saro-Wiwa in a meeting:  
In the meeting which we held in Dr Leton’s house, Ken made that proposal, 
that whether we vote or not, Ogoni votes will have nothing to do with the 
presidential elections, but if we do that, it will attract attention to our cause. 
Most of us the younger folks bought that idea, we wanted something that 
was exciting which most of our leaders didn’t like. There were those who 
felt that we were with the government and those who felt if you were with 
the government you are not with us. 21 
 
The decision to boycott the elections developed into an “us versus them” issue, showing 
that individual and group interests played a significant role. The problems within 
                                                             
20 MOSOP comprises 10 affiliated bodies: the National Youth Council of Ogoni People; 
Ogoni Council of Churches; Council of Ogoni Traditional Rulers; Ogoni Students Unions; 
National Union of Ogoni Students; Ogoni Teachers Union; Federation of Ogoni Women 
Associations; Ogoni Central Union; Committee of the Leaders of Thought; and the Council of 
Ogoni Professionals (see Okonta, 2008). 
21 Interview with Ledum Mitee, Ogoni leader, 2 August 2016. 
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MOSOP led to the resignation of some of its leaders in 1993, causing serious 
disagreements between some of the remaining leaders and Saro-Wiwa (Okonta, 2008).  
 
Watts (1999, 2003) suggested that Saro-Wiwa made use of the over 50 years of Ogoni 
unification and built upon decades of anger to provide a critical mass and to stir a youth-
driven ardor within an indigenous subject, in a space that was highly debatable and 
challenging. Watts also challenged Saro-Wiwa’s claim of having the support of 98 
percent of Ogonis, claiming that, because clear differences and divergences existed 
between Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni elites, MOSOP exemplified a fractured and 
increasingly divided “we”. Bob and Nepstad (2007: 1387) argued that Saro-Wiwa tried 
to depict the Ogoni movement generally as a struggle for environmental justice and 
human rights instead of for “complex, regional ethnic minority rights”. They criticized 
the framing of the entire Ogoni cause within environmentalism and human rights as a 
“weaker” foundation for unified engagement (ibid.: 1389).  
 
Mitee recounts that the Ogoni leaders deliberated on the options available to them:  
We clearly looked at all the options, the question of armed struggle, the 
Nigerian system is so violent that the only thing that they listen to is 
violence. After hours of arguments we rejected all that based on two main 
considerations, first is that of our terrain, ours is just a flat land, so where 
do you run to? Secondly is the philosophical angle, if the Nigerian system 
is this violent, then what do you do? We decided to take an option that would 
bring out the contrast between us and at the same time get public sympathy 
locally and internationally. 22   
 
According to certain informants, women in Ogoniland played a key role in ensuring 
that non-violence became the norm in the struggle; they contributed significantly to the 
massive Ogoni protest (Barikor-Wiwa, 1997: 1). Women frequently led MOSOP 




demonstrations, parading at the front to call attention to the demonstration’s 
peacefulness (Demirel-Pegg and Pegg, 2015: 658).  
 
4.3 Ijaw Kaiama Declaration 
 
Frustrated by economic and political marginalization exacerbated by environmental 
pollution, the Ijaw youth came together in an “All Ijaw Youth Conference” on 11 
December 1999 and issued the Kaiama Declaration in the Kaiama community of 
Bayelsa state. The conference, themed “Regaining Control of Our Destiny”, recorded 
the attendance of more than 5,000 Ijaw youths from over 500 communities of about 40 
clans within the Ijaw nation (IYC, 1999b). They considered the way forward to 
safeguard the uninterrupted existence of the indigenous Ijaws. Imitating the Ogoni, they 
confirmed their unceasing membership of the Nigerian state (MOSOP, 2008: 42) but, 
unlike the Ogoni, they demanded self-government and control of resources (IYC, 
1999b: 10). The Kaiama Declaration proclaimed that, being the basis of their survival, 
all land and natural resources within the Ijaw territory should belong to the 
communities. They declared their non-recognition of all decrees enacted without their 
agreement that robbed the Ijaw of the right to ownership and control of their resources 
(ibid.).  
 
A year earlier, on 29 and 30 December 1998, in the states of Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers 
in the Niger Delta, demonstrations and protest marches had been met with the full might 
of the Nigerian state security apparatus (Nwajiaku, 2005: 457). The formation of 
MOSOP and IYC and the rejection of the elders’ perceived actions by the two groups 
represents another similarity in terms of the youths taking over the struggles. However, 
unlike Saro-Wiwa in the Ogoni struggle, no particular leader headed the Ijaw struggle; 
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rather, it was led by a group of Ijaw youth. There were no intensive Ijaw mobilization 
campaigns; instead, a conference was held and the decision to engage the state was 
made there. Furthermore, where the Ijaw formed two principal umbrella organizations, 
Ijaw National Council (INC) and IYC, the Ogoni relied on one umbrella organization, 
MOSOP. The right to Ijaw self-determination as a unique and equal nation became 
central to the formation of IYC, encompassing all Ijaw progressive nations of the world 
and stakeholders. Although Nwajiaku (2005: 470) asserted that the INC was mainly 
tasked with the mobilization of past, present, and potential future political personalities, 
the IYC stood for those youth who contested the way in which members of the Ijaw 
political class had acted in the past. Similarly to the Ogoni MOSOP, IYC was set up to 
coordinate the Ijaw struggle for self-determination and justice (IYC, 1999b). It 
demonstrates the importance of the formation of a non-partisan, socio-cultural, 
revolutionary political organization tasked with the promotion, preservation, and 
protection of the Ijaw political destiny, language and history, culture and custom, the 
environment, and natural resources, as cited in the IYC constitution. 
 
The Kaiama Declaration was also met with repression by the state; this enabled certain 
Ijaw leaders to use the repression as a legitimation for turning to violence. Okonta 
(2006: 24) described MEND as the violent outcome of decades of intentional 
limitations of the social space in the Niger Delta, whereby the people had been denied 
their public and political rights in their lawful quest for material and social welfare. 
MEND emerged in 2004 to call international attention to the plight of the Ijaw people 
(see Okonta, 2006). Its visibility increased after the arrest and detention of Asari 
Dokubo and Chief Ebitimi Banigo and after the impeachment and detention of D.S.P. 
Alamieyeseigha; together these three episodes constituted attempts to break and 
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humiliate the Ijaw (Ukiwo, 2007: 605). The group’s key strategy in drawing attention 
to their activities included sending out pictures of heavily armed youths in masks, with 
helpless oil workers at their mercy (Okonta, 2006: 4). The militia leaders were 
organized in camps, with camp 5 under Tompolo’s control being the core. Located in 
creeks, these military-style camps were separated from the main communities: “There 
were about 140 camps in the different states, a lot of discussions took place in camp 5, 
it was the camp vice president Jonathan went to on June 28 during the amnesty 
negotiations”. 23  
 
The establishment of these camps was a clear indication that, as far as the militia groups 
were concerned, there was no longer any alternative to the option of violence. The 
camps also meant a shift in the character of the violence: the militia actions became 
organized rather than an indiscriminate type of guerrilla violence. The situation 
compelled the deployment of a joint military task force including the police to conduct 




This article has established that narrative, leadership, and organizational structure have 
been key elements in the strategic choices of the Ogoni and Ijaw movements. Historical 
understanding of the Ogoni and Ijaw movements allows us to make sense of several 
episodes that are difficult to explain without employing the lens of leadership 
narratives. Through the construction of narratives, the two groups of leaders situated 
                                                             
23 Interview with Timi Ogoriba, Ijaw leader, Abuja, 10 August 2015.  
24 Hakuri is a Hausa word for patience. 
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past history within factual frames of events relating to their identity; thus, the past 
became directly linked to the construction and reconstruction of collective meanings 
(Feldman, 2001; Touraine, 1981, 1985). The social construction of reality was used to 
analyse the structure of facts that determined the directions the different narratives 
charted. Even more crucial is the positive engagement with non-violence in the 
relationship between the self-determination of groups and the political strategies they 
adopted to determine the choice of non-violence (Cunningham, 2013).  
 
Undertaking actions for reasons meant applying an understanding of “what is called 
for” (Giddens, 1984: 345) by the Ijaw and Ogoni leaderships within a set of situations. 
Here, a link emerges with the identification of an underlying bond between ideas and 
material relations (Fierke, 2015: 121), as the Ogoni systematically pitched their struggle 
to fit internationally recognized narratives of minority issues such as internal 
colonialism and human rights. Although the Ijaw did not explicitly regard their situation 
as internal colonialism, a sense of internal colonialism was evident in the interviews, in 
the narratives of exclusion and domination by the more powerful ethnic groups.  
 
Closely related to the dynamics of choice is the type of leadership responsible for the 
different courses of action undertaken by the Ogoni and Ijaw. The discourses and 
political practices championed by Ken Saro-Wiwa humanized the enemy, and being 
purposive, he organized and coordinated the Ogoni in an attempt to compel the state to 
transform the status quo through civil disruption and international pressure (Sharp, 
2005). The Ogoni demonstrated a more disciplined and intellectual leadership, while 
the nature of Ijaw leadership has been less well-coordinated and unified. There have 
been different types of Ijaw leadership, one comprising the non-violent, intellectual 
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youth leaders, and the other, the less educated, more radical and violent militants. A 
clear insight has been provided into the often-ignored fluid and fractured nature of Ijaw 
leadership, which had a major impact on the character and nature of the movement as 
it shifted from a non-violent to a violent armed struggle.  
 
The differences in social status between the Ogoni and Ijaw leaders form a further 
distinction. The adoption of narratives outlined the salience of linguistic aspects 
employed in violence: “in order to practice violence, you need to talk violence, and 
dehumanize the other in the language” (Apter, 1996: 2). In the non-violence scenario, 
campaign leaders employed contingent and context-specific methods depending on the 
structural conditions in which they operated (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2015). The 
backgrounds and experiences of Ogoni leaders provided well-informed platforms from 
which they operated with a collective sense of agency. The Ijaw outlook, on the other 
hand, was based on the state’s denial of agency, leaving them with no other choice than 
to engage in violence. This article has ascertained that while the Ogoni have continued 
to press their demands through the OBR, the Ijaw’s Kaiama Declaration remained 
relevant for only a few months and quickly became lost in the transformation from non-
violence to violence embodied by the emergence of MEND. The combination of the 
“why” and “how” discussed here also explained how groups navigated through 
different conflict options available to them to achieve their goal; thus, the fact that the 
Ogoni maintain their non-violent stance to the present day, while the Ijaw have 
embraced a cocktail of violence and non-violence, serves as a good example of the 
importance of using different theoretical concepts to better explain why the Niger Delta 
conflicts evolved the way they did. Despite their shared lived experiences, the Ogoni 
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